Militarize the Police! A Thought Experiment
By which I mean ban police unions, have one police agency per state, with strong civilian leadership, a transparent bureaucracy, and an educated, professional managerial and detective class that does not share the culture of patrol.
[This is a draft in progress, comments and citations are welcome.]
According to Peter Fever, the central problem of civil-military relations, “is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”[1] The problem of civil-police relations is not appreciably different. The police are armed agents of the state, but they are also an interest group with their own economic and political interests. While there has never been a police coup, to my knowledge, the police can exercise inordinate power through their ability threaten to unjustly investigate and punish and withhold essential services, as well as more standard interest group actions like funding and endorsing candidates. Through these means they are able to dictate their own procedures and conditions of work against the expressed interests of voters and civilian politicians. And, as shown during the George Floyd protests, when their interests are challenged, they are able to use force independently against opposition, both as direct intimidation and as a way to discredit opposition by creating images of violent protest.
The academic literature on civil-military relations is clear on this issue. Unacceptable military influence in politics does not begin and end with coups, but includes the military using its unique position in the state to dictate policy and procedures to the civilians who should have the final say over where, when, and how the military acts, what the military controls and what it does not, and what the rules of engagement are for military actions. As Huntington puts it, the military officer, must be limited, “by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.”[2] It should be no different for the police.
How to reach this point for the police is contentious, and this piece is a thought experiment more than a full proposal. I am not an expert on civil-police relations (if such a field of study exists) but on civil-military relations, and particularly civil-military relations in authoritarian regimes. My book, Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression,[3] looked at six cases from the Arab Spring as well as the Iranian Revolution to see how different military structures determined military decision-making and success in response to popular uprisings. It argues institutional structure is the most important factor, though education and socialization come into play. This focus on structure is not universal in the literature on civil-military relations theory that focuses on democracies, which also includes focus on identity, ideology, and interests. All these come into play in my analysis, but I focus on structure, because I believe that institutions create the conditions under which interests, identities, and ideologies form and operate, as such they should be the starting. In the case of policing, I believe new norms of training, socialization, and oversight cannot work on the necessary scale until the malign institutional structures are replaced, and I believe it is worth considering the military model as a basis for a new policing model.
As with much, though not all, of the civil-military relations literature, this work focuses on the role of the officer corps, with limited discussion of enlisted-officer relations. There are definitely scholars of civil-military relations that make the question of relations between officers and enlisted troops central to their analysis[4], but I argue it is primarily the officer class and unit structures that determine outcomes, and the value of that stance will, I believe, become clearer later. Finally, this argument assumes that policing will never be an occupation that exclusively caters to the college-educated, and what society is willing to pay police, along with the hierarchical nature of policing limiting advancement potential for most police, means that a military model of officer and enlisted is necessary to fill out the necessary rosters.
Armed Agents as Professionals
The foundational text of civil-military relations in the modern world is probably Samuel Huntington’s, The Soldier and the State. In it, he lays out a conception of the modern military officer as a professional. That is, as warfare became more complex, “the management of violence,” came to resemble a profession like medicine or law, with its characteristics of “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.” [5] As I summarize it in my book, the modern military officer should have:
A high degree of expertise honed through education and research, a sense of responsibility to the society the soldier serves through the exercise of his profession, and a sense of corporate identity among officers created through common bonds formed in training and the separate social and work circles frequented by officers.[6]
Managing a modern military machine is a specialized skill, which required intensive, specialized, and ongoing education, a sense of responsibility to both the public and the profession itself, and a sense of community among the practitioners. Essential to understand here is that this sense of professional community among officers should not only make them feel distinct from the civilians outside the profession, but also distinct from the enlisted, non-professionals they manage and command. As with lawyers and doctors, this sense of professional solidarity has drawbacks, they will at times be inclined to protect their professional interests at the expense of the public interest, they will lobby for their professional interests, including greater control over their own managing their own professional affairs (such as the AMA and Bar Associations), and for military officers, their closed communities may allow for conspiracy. Certainly professionalism is not enough in the case of the military, the New Professionalism identified among South American militaries trained by the US in anti-insurgency led them to coup in order to defend what they viewed as the national good, but which was also in their own best interests.[7] This has led many analysts to focus on socialization, education, and ideology among officers, and the necessity of imbuing a, “firm acceptance of civilian supremacy,”[8] and a belief that the civilian leaders, “have a right to be wrong,” [9] beyond the idea of professionalism. The military must be conditioned to the belief that they are the agents of the civilian government, even if they do not agree with its policies or believe civilians are competent to make the decisions. Beyond that, civilians must also be conditioned not to bring the military into their partisan battles. Civilians may call on the support of militaries in their competition for civil power, this will have a tendency for the military to think and act as a political interest group and not as apolitical servants of the civilian system, not particular political leaders.[10] I do not disagree with any of these points, but argue that institutional structure comes first and is a necessary scaffolding on which to build proper education and socialization, particularly for the supervisory officer classes. A well-compensated and respected professional class will find value in both the independence and limits of that profession and, if allowed freedom and advancement within those limits, will be less likely to either look outside for influence or accept outsiders using them to gain influence.
Huntington argues that there are three characteristics of professionalism: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Combining the work of many others with my own analysis, I propose there are seven institutional features that can be used to determine the professionalism of a military: Representativeness, Cohesiveness, Distinctiveness, Subordination, Bureaucratization, Expertise, and External Focus. High values on all of these features denote a professional military, while deficiencies signify militaries that do not meet those requirements and are more prone to being politicized either internally or through outside influence. In the context of popular uprisings, professional militaries are less willing to repress peaceful uprisings to defend authoritarian regimes, because they know their professional interests do not depend on the whim of the dictator and siding with the dictator may cause them to go down with him. Militaries that are co-rulers of the state or have strong interests to protect within the state as it exists are more likely to use force to defend it.[11]
§ Representativeness: is whether the military (or police) reflect the diversity of society, not only should the military reflect the makeup of society, but units must be mixed, so that people from different backgrounds serve together and serve both as officers and enlisted troops. Militaries can either exclude groups completely, or shunt them into separate units, as was common in the Middle East and the pre-integration US military.
§ Cohesiveness: is whether the military is organized as single organization or is broken into competing factions with overlapping responsibilities. The US military is broken into service branches with some overlapping responsibilities and which compete for resources, but they are under a unified command. Other militaries may include whole units under essentially separate command structures. US police agencies are fragmented and overlapping in jurisdiction both substantive and geographic.
§ Distinctiveness: is whether military officers a separate professional class, distinct from other areas of government or society. Where military officers move in and out of civilian government positions (as governors for instance) or do non-military jobs (such as running a company related to military procurement) they do not have a distinct identity as professional soldiers and instead have overlapping career and political commitments. If their professional advancement depends on the military, they will guard the interests of the professional military class and the military institution.
§ Bureaucratization: One of the rules of a profession is that they are able to manage their own internal procedures with limited external meddling and in times of crisis. A bureaucratic military has clear chains of command; clear, written procedures for advancement; and clear rules of behavior that protect individuals from political meddling and favoritism and allow them to operate as a unified group. A military where political considerations determine promotions and punishments will be prone to infighting, political factions, and officers both seeking outside aid for internal competitions and being open to outside inducements by civilian politicians. These bureaucratic procedures should be set and monitored by civilian authorities, but largely managed internally.
§ Subordination: Is whether the military is organizationally and ideologically subordinate to the civilian state. In the case of militaries, the most important question is whether the senior military officers are civilians (this is why the recent US practice of making just-retired generals Secretary of Defense needs to stop). In many countries, the military has the legal right to intervene on its own to defend the state from political crisis. Beyond the question of legal and effective civilian dominance, it is hard to measure subordination, but the most important indication is whether, when militaries (or police) come into political conflict with the civilian leadership, do the military (or police) lose.
§ Expertise: Expertise measures the complexity of military training, equipment, and doctrine. Does the military (or police) have good equipment and know how to use it? Do they have a thought out doctrine and effectively train to that doctrine? One of the more important things to understand about American police is that they are really not very good at solving or preventing crimes.
When considering clearances of violent crimes, 61.6 percent of murder offenses, 53.3 percent of aggravated assault offenses, 34.5 percent of rape offenses, and 29.7 percent of robbery offenses were cleared. Among property crimes, 19.2 percent of larceny-theft offenses, 13.7 percent of motor vehicle theft offenses, and 13.5 percent of burglary offenses were cleared.[12]
§ External Focus: In civil-military relations it is essential for the military to focus on an external enemy, otherwise it may come to see the civilians as its enemy and the current government — as opposed to the state or the nation — as what they are protecting. One of the characteristics of the New Professionalism in Latin America in the 1970s is that militaries had many of the other features of professionalism, including distinctiveness, bureaucratic procedures, cohesiveness, and expertise, but their primary enemy was internal revolutionaries. This not only made them see parts of their own population as the enemy, but US training in social sciences, which was intended to allow them to understand the conditions under which revolutionaries thrived, made them think they were competent to manage the state through the crises they perceived.[13] Other militaries, like the Egyptian military, did not normally have guerillas to fight, but did control a huge number of economic enterprises, so they had many interests beyond a focus on fighting external enemies and many interests to protect when challenged. In addition to giving militaries non-military interest to protect, these multiple foci also tend to make militaries less competent at their job of external war-fighting. Police cannot help but have an internal focus, but I will argue the nature of that focus can change, from “enforcing the law,” or even worse, “enforcing the social order,” to the more narrow role of, “preventing and solving crimes.”
So how does military professionalism look in practice? It creates a separation between the troops, who can be said to be learning a trade — whether that be actual fighting or some combination of fighting and one of the many skills needed to maintain a fighting force — and the officers who have a profession — which includes a large body of theoretical and academic specialization, as well as a culture of continued learning and advancement. Officers move between assignments every few years, occasionally stopping off for new academic training and doing several jobs in the organization while advancing. This moving around, combined with the fact that the most senior enlisted trooper is technically subordinate to the most junior officer, creates a separation between the troops and the officers. Officers instead will tend to socialize with other officers. They have their own clubs, their own schools, and as a result their own professional culture. Officers are, of course, dependent on enlisted troops, but outside of times of actual combat, they have different interests. Officers operate within a strong bureaucracy where promotions are made on clear criteria with a paper trail. Every organization has its internal politics, and the higher up one goes within the military the more external influence there is, but for most of the officers for most of their careers, the outcomes are predictable. Troops on the other hand are often short-timers. As they go up in the non-commissioned ranks, sergeants may move around more and get more responsibility, but they are very unlikely to make the jump to the officer corps. And if they do, they are required to go to special training school for officers. Instead, non-commissioned officers have their own social clubs and social circles. There are also specialist officers, like doctors and warrant officers (including some kinds of pilots) who are officers for the purposes of commanding their direct subordinates, but who may not have the same educational requirements as the professional officers whose job is managing large bodies of troops and equipment in combat.
Police, crucially, do not make this distinction between tradespeople and professionals, patrollers and experts. A college degree might allow greater advancement potential in some larger, more bureaucratized departments, but all police go through the same academy training, which is a matter of months at best. They all spend time in patrol (except for perhaps those sent undercover straight from the academy, unless this is only a movie thing), which completes their training on the job. There may be some short courses as people move from patrol to being supervisors or detectives,[14] but nothing like the requirement of having a college degree or the officer candidate school and subsequent specialized training that it takes to move from enlisted to officer in the military.
This does three pernicious things:
1) It ensures that all police, in some measure, share the culture of patrol, which can obviously be pernicious, and encourages social connections between supervisors and subordinates that you do not want in an organization with both so much power and such a closed culture. When the interests of specific patrollers, or patrol more broadly, come in conflict with the interest of the civilian government or the police agency as a whole, we want supervisors who do not share the interests or prejudices of patrol.
2) It does not create the kind of professional expertise you want from supervisors and detectives. There is no reason to imagine being a good patroller will result in being a good detective, and every reason to imagine these are very different skill sets. Tradespeople may be highly skilled in their often-difficult area of expertise, but for the more complex and varied task of managing patrol and investigating crime, we want highly-educated professionals.
3) It may discourage entry by people who may make excellent managers and detectives, but who do not imagine they would be accepted or comfortable within the culture of patrol. One imagines many more excellent college graduates: women, LGBTQ, racial and religious minorities, would be more eager to become police if they could skip the pernicious culture of patrol and go straight to becoming a specialist. This diversity in the supervisory corps would then, no doubt, allow for more diversity in patrol.
A Professional Police Force
So how to change things? Treat the police like you treat the military: an armed servant with professional interests you respect, but which is subordinate to the civilian government, not a member of it. Note: This piece does not have a good theory of how to get to there from here, but presents this as an ideal outcome and source for discussion. However, given complete power, I would start with a medium-sized state, with at least one big city with a pernicious police culture, and with progressive state leadership willing to fight for change and try something new. Minnesota seems ideal.
1) Get rid of almost all police organizations and combine them into single state police agencies.
§ There are too many small police agencies to effectively monitor, socialize, or manage. Large bureaucratic organizations have their own problems, but they can be monitored more easily by politicians, journalism, and civil society, as well as being (by necessity) more bound by rules and procedures, with things written down that can later be reviewed. There are too many small police agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and duties, with a few dozen or a few hundred officers, and where officers fired from one organization can quietly find a job in another.
§ These large police organizations will allow for the creation of the specialized supervisory and detective class desired. Small police organizations do not allow for the creation of these specialized classes of officers who move around the organization and maintain a distinct culture and social circle from patrol.
§ The largest cities might be able to have separate police agencies, particularly in states where rural and exurban Conservatives dominate state government but there are large diverse cities in the state they prefer to demonize and defund. If they do, it should be done at the county level, so that city electorates dominate county policing and all policing in the county is done by one agency. No more overlapping sheriff and police departments, no separate transit or university police departments. Universities can have their own private security guards, but should not have separate police departments, where the safety of students may come second to other university concerns and this filters down to the police.
2) Create a special class of highly-educated, police professionals trained for supervisory and detective positions, separate from those in patrol.
§ The ideal would be the military academy model. One could easily imagine two or three regional police academies as highly-selective four-year colleges with full tuition support from the government, designed to attract talented people from all walks of American life for a long-term career in policing specially trained in law, personnel management and command, tactics and use of force, and detective work. These officers would then compete for jobs in the state and Federal police.
· The US Army, Navy, and Air Force academies graduate around 3,000 students a year combined, for an active duty military of 1.4 million. One imagines the ratio of supervisors and detectives to patrol should be higher than officers to troops in the military. The Bureau of Labor Statistics puts the number of full-time law enforcement officers in 2019 at 654,900.[15] One can imagine three regional academy colleges, each graduating 1000 new police professionals a year, or one national police academy graduating 3000.
· This system would ideally open policing to a much wider range of people, racial, religious, and sexual minorities who might feel that they could never be accepted into the police culture as it currently exists, particularly in patrol, and people with education and ambition that do not see sufficient prospects for social and economic advancement in the current organization of policing. Certainly the military academies have histories of harassment, particularly of the first entrants from previously-excluded groups, but starting from scratch with a diverse body of recruits should solve much of that problem.
§ Like the Officer Candidate Schools in the military, there would be a second track for college students who did not go to the academies to get a college degree elsewhere and then the equivalent of a Master’s Degree in policing, also for patrol officers who get college degrees and want to move into the officer ranks. Officers would also be encourage throughout their careers to get additional training as they move from one position to another: science, law, and social sciences masters’ and doctorates, specialized management and tactical training, etc. The military has specialized programs at their bases and academies for ongoing training, and military officers are often allowed to take time away from combat and command roles to get PhDs and Master’s degrees in political science and international relations as a way to advance in rank and bring new knowledge into the profession.
§ For patrol, college degrees will not be necessary and the shorter courses will be sufficient. They will not be able to advance beyond the lowest management roles without a college degree, and salaries will be lower. As with troopers, we might consider whether we want patrol to be a lifetime career for most, whether the benefits of experience outweigh the drawbacks of being steeped in a patrol culture, but that is a question for later.
§ It will be necessary to increase wages for policing professionals to attract and retain the best talent. Language change might also be useful. I have been using “Officer” and “Patrol/Patroller” separately for a reason, as the military distinguishes between officers and soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines. There is value to thinking of these as separate roles and career tracks
§ As stated above, this proposal imagines there is not a need for every patroller to be a highly-educated, highly-paid professionals, and that there is a place for people with limited education and limited ambitions. It also imagines that it would be prohibitively expensive for all police to be paid the necessary wage and impossible to provide the necessary opportunity for advancement needed to attract primarily college graduates. As it is, military officers who do not advance after a certain number of opportunities are forced to leave the military so that the middle ranks do not become overstuffed. This might also be necessary for police, though with the greater number of non-command specialists required (i.e. detectives) this might be less necessary.
§ As this system develops, you could beging to disarm many members of patrol and provide them only with less-lethal weapons, like stun guns. As the profession officers get better at solving crimes, you could focus less on patrol interrupting crimes in progress or lucking into finding a criminal during a traffic stop. Instead, like the UK model, most patrollers, especially those on foot patrol, could be armed with less-lethal weapons and you could have a limited number of specially-trained and managed police with deadly weapons who respond to dangerous emergencies.
§ Other specialists, like forensics experts, could be treated like officers for purposes of rank and pay but not advancement, like warrant officers in the military.
3) Put the police under civilian operational control. The governor should be commander of the state police with an appointed civilian leader put over the top police leaders or a separate elected official to be in charge of the state police, like a State Attorney General.
§ The Department of Defense is led (up until recently) by a civilian with a civilian’s interests, someone who respects but does not share the military’s culture and professional concerns. The same should be the case for police agencies. Given that states tend to have elected Attorneys General rather than the appointed one in the Federal Government, it possible some states would prefer to directly elect the civilian leader of the state police. I find this idea problematic, particularly because electing sheriffs is such a bad idea, but it is better than law enforcement leaders coming from inside the police force. If elected, the civilian commissioner of police should be term limited so they do not become to identified or sympathetic to police interests.
§ Each major geographic or functional unit should have civilian bureaucrats working with the uniformed chief. As with civilian leaders, they should change and rotate relatively often to ensure they do not become too steeped in police culture and interests or attached to particular units.
§ Police professionals should manage subordinates and focus on their expertise, not dictate policy. Like the service chiefs in the military, police chiefs that represent different geographical regions and perhaps organizational units could serve as a management committee that answers to the civilian commander, but should not be in overall command and should not be the face of the police force.
§ Where the police model must differ from the military model is in internal law enforcement. The military has its own internal court and prison system. This makes a certain degree of sense as the military operates by very different rules than the civilian world and crimes may be committed by one trooper against another or against foreign civilians without ever interacting with American civilians. This is not the case with police. As a professional organization, police agencies should be able to manage breaking of internal regulations on their own, but potential crimes committed by police against civilians must be treated as crimes against the public and investigated by civilian bodies, not the police themselves.
4) Police should not be able to have unions.
§ Police are armed servants and should not be able to lobby or influence politics as an interest group. Separating supervisors, specialists, and detective from patrol will also weaken ties, but active-duty officers should not be able to collect dues to form political associations that promote candidates or push political changes. As for lobbying for the economic interests of active-duty officers, part of the role of senior military officers is to make recommendations for changes to how the military should be organized, paid, and managed, but they are not the final decision-makers and they are not able to lobby voters to elect people that will support officers’ preferred policy. That should be the model for the police.
· I don’t know how this will be done legally, but active duty military do not have unions. Retired officers can have social clubs and benevolent associations, but active-duty police officers should not be able to have unions.
· I am not sure how to handle police associations’ provision of defense council to members from union funds, “PBA Lawyers” in entertainment jargon. In this case, the military model may be best, with defense lawyers provided by the police agency itself, but it is a thorny issue that would require greater discussion.
5) The police need to change their focus from, “enforcing social order,” to “preventing and solving crimes.”
§ In fiction, there are two kinds of bad cops: There is the corrupt cop who commits crimes to personally enrich themselves, and there is the cop who believes his job is not simply to solve crimes or enforce the law, but to ensure the social order, so that the people they view as their real constituency feels safe and comfortable. That cop uses the law in corrupt ways to protect what he believes to be the proper social order. This may (and often does) include racism, classism, and other forms of prejudice. Preventing venal corruption is a matter of creating transparent bureaucracies, an officer class that does not share interests with patrol, and a civilian oversight and investigation organization. Preventing ideological corruption requires changing the police’s idea of themselves through professional education, changing the language around policing, and shifting duties from police to other government bodies.
§ This, of course, starts with a professional officer corps. These officers should be trained in the law and police procedure, but also in an ideology that focuses their duties on crime prevention and investigation. Officers steeped in this ideology will oversee patrollers, who will be managed and pressured to follow this ideology.
§ The key to this ideology should be to limit their focus to the narrow area of crime, and leave quality of life issues and “social order” to other groups. Crime prevention and detection should supersede the broad idea of “law enforcement.”
§ This is completely consistent with the movements to reduce the areas of police responsibility in order to get better outcomes. Police are already limited in which laws they enforce: they don’t enforce workplace laws or parking violations, for instance. The areas outside of police jurisdiction and responsibility can be easily be expanded. Instead of police going to non-violent disturbances and neighborhood issues, send social workers.
· It is not consistent with the idea of cutting police funding. While combining all police agencies in each state into a single organization might create savings through bureaucratization and economies of scale, attracting and educated, professional officer corps will require increasing salaries for these experts.
§ By focusing on crime solving, police can also develop better expertise at that part of the job — which they are really not very good at — while changing how they conceive of their relationship with the public. Enforcing the social order, or law enforcement, however conceived, makes much more of the civilian population a potential opponent than, “crime prevention and investigation,” does.
· Police should be measured first by how many crimes they solve, rather than how many crimes are reported. This not only will get them out of the business of harassing homeless people, intervening in neighborhood disputes, or arresting mentally ill people who should be in a hospital, but will have positive impacts on reducing crime. There is good evidence that small, sure punishment is a better deterrent than unlikely but drastic punishment.[16] That is, it is better to have a system where few people get away with crimes, and are likely to be punished lightly if they commit them, than a system where most crimes go unsolved, but the few people who are caught get drastic punishment.
§ This will require rewriting rules of conduct for police officers, but also changes in how 911 and social services systems operate. There should be greater oversight and discretion in the 911 systems, with either professional officers or civilians determining whether it is better to dispatch police or social services, the preference being for social services. Social services agencies should also expand to include non-professional patrollers. That is, not every social worker should require a four-year degree, there should be opportunities for street-level social workers with less education who intervene and deescalate in non-violent situations, with educated professionals as case officers and managing patrols.
Conclusion
The military is not perfect, of course. Troops break the law and follow illegal orders, as in taking part in torture. Some troops join hate groups or have hateful ideologies; there are traitors, rapists, thieves, and brutes. Officers hide and downplay offenses by their subordinates to cover for themselves and the service. But the police do all these things too and, in addition, police are not very good at their jobs of solving and preventing crime, large numbers of them share in a pernicious and racist culture, and they have far more independence in managing themselves, and far more political power over the civilians that are supposed to be commanding them, than they should.
This is piece is a thought experiment about the potential for rethinking policing in a military fashion: creating large, bureaucratic, professional police forces where civilians have ultimate command and day-to-day management is carried out by a diverse cadre of highly-educated, professional officers with high degrees of expertise and a different culture from the patrollers they manage. The goal is to create a socially diverse class of experts at the top who will then imbue, as much as possible, that culture into patrol, while at the same time being trained and encouraged to focus on a narrow area of solving and preventing crime, instead of the broad social role they currently claim, and the broad political power they currently exercise.
[1] Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, (Harvard University Press, 2005), 149
[2] Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations, (Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1981), 13–14
[3] https://www.amazon.com/Revolts-Military-Arab-Spring-Repressions/dp/1784538930/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=Revolts+and+the+military+in+the+arab+spring&qid=1627746125&sr=8-1
[4] Zoltan Barany How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016)
[5] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 7
[6] Sean Burns, Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression, (London, IB Tauris, 2018), 28
[7] Alfred Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,’ in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973)
[8] S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006)
[9] Feaver, Armed Servants, 5–6
[10] Michael C Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1–17
[11] Burns, Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring, 41–55
[12] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearances
[13] Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism,’ 50
[14] https://www.lapdonline.org/training_division/content_basic_view/6379
[15] https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes333051.htm
[16] https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence
